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Abstract
We estimate whether students update their college application portfolios in response to large,
unanticipated information shocks generated by the release of SAT scores – a primary component
of admissions decisions. Exploiting new population data on the timing of college selection and
a policy that induces students to choose colleges prior to taking exam, we find that the release
of scores causes students to update their portfolios in terms of selectivity, tuition, and sector.
However, the magnitude of updating is too modest to significantly reduce unexplained variation
across students, suggesting that non-academic factors may be the dominant determinants of
college choice.
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1 Introduction
A large literature considers the role of non-academic determinants of college choice, such as tuition
rates and parental resources. Updating human capital decisions to reflect new information about
academic aptitude provides an important alternative to such explanations. Thus recent studies have
examined how the revelation of college grades affect students’ dropout decisions and choice of major
(Zafar, 2011; Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang, 2012; Stange, 2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2012 and 2013; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015; and Arcidiacono et al. 2015). This paper provides a direct
analogue at another crucial time for human capital investment – when students decide where to
apply to college. Specifically, we examine if students update their college application portfolios in
response to large, unanticipated positive and negative information shocks generated by the release
of SAT scores. Using new population data on the timing of when students select colleges for their
portfolios, we exploit a design that contrasts colleges selected before and after SAT scores are
released. College admission exams are among the most important determinants of admissions and
represent perhaps the single most important source of new information students receive during
the college selection process. If portfolios are not updated in response to the release of scores, it
indicates that college choices are essentially predetermined by non-academic factors and preexisting
beliefs. Measuring the extent of inertia is important for understanding how expectations are formed
and because of the potentially high returns to college quality.1
The primary challenge to estimating student responses to academic information is the need
to observe college choices before and after new information is revealed. This is perhaps one reason
why the literature has focused on dropout and major choices in response to the intermittent release
of grades during college. Unfortunately, a student has only one college application portfolio and, in
many cases, receives only one college entrance exam score. To overcome this we exploit a College
Board policy that induces students to identify a limited number of colleges to receive their scores
for free at the time that they register for the exam.2 Subsequently, students receive their score
and choose if and where to send additional reports. Using a new national data set that includes
the exact date when each college was selected by the student, we are able to estimate the effect
of SAT information shocks on the composition of college portfolios. Conditional on sending more
score reports, an unanticipated positive (negative) shock in SAT score causes a student to select
a portfolio of colleges that has higher (lower) selectivity, tuition, graduation rates, and fraction of
private colleges. However, the estimated effects are quite modest in magnitude in absolute terms and
relative to cross-sectional differences. In fact, the change in a student’s overall college portfolio in
response to an SAT score shock is one-tenth the size of cross-sectional estimates. This is surprising
in light of the importance of the SAT for college admissions, and suggests that socioeconomic
differences in college application behavior stem predominantly from non-academic factors and is
1See, for example, Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996), Black and Smith (2006), Hoekstra (2009), and
Cohodes and Goodman (2014).
2See Pallais (2015) for analysis showing that students tend to use the free score reports available prior to taking
the exam. Three-quarters of SAT takers in our data use at least one of their free reports and about two-thirds of
these students use all four.
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not meaningfully reduced with objective information about one’s likelihood of admission to selective
colleges.
Several factors make this environment a nearly ideal context for identifying the extent to
which students update their college portfolios. First, many students experience large SAT score
shocks that are difficult to anticipate. Specifically, the standard deviation of within-student dif-
ferences between first and second SAT scores is 70.3 points, or 0.35 standard deviations. Score
variation of this magnitude is sufficient to significantly alter students’ probability of admission to
colleges.3 Our empirical design allows us to test whether students accurately anticipate their SAT
scores, and we find no evidence that they do. Second, unlike studies that rely on surveys of stu-
dents’ subjective beliefs, we are able to observe beliefs through the high stakes decision of selecting
colleges to receive scores. Third, the data used for analysis include students’ PSAT scores and, in
many cases, multiple SAT attempts. This allows us to estimate what information contained in a
newly released score is new to the student. Fourth, students make their pre-exam college choices
shortly before taking the SAT, limiting the potential that updating stems from time-varying factors
that are correlated with exam performance.4 Finally, the analysis is based on national adminis-
trative data that produces precise estimates and allows us to consider heterogeneous effects across
important socio-economic characteristics such as income and race.
Identification is based on a difference-in-difference style design that estimates the extent to
which college portfolios selected before and after students observe their scores reflect this new infor-
mation. We present an empirical model analogous to those in the employer learning literature that
reveals several important considerations for the interpretation of the reduced form results.5 The
model confirms that students will place greater importance on SAT scores after they are released
and will reduce their reliance on measures of aptitude that were previously used to anticipate SAT
scores. We highlight that estimates of updating may be downward biased to the extent that stu-
dents accurately anticipate their scores using unobservable information. Importantly, we show how
the magnitude of attenuation can be estimated explicitly.
The estimates show that after a student learns that she scored 100 points higher on the SAT
than anticipated, she will begin applying to colleges whose matriculates scored about 5 points higher
on the exam. This is equivalent to a 1 standard deviation change in a student’s score generating an
approximately 0.10 standard deviation shift in the selectivity of newly selected colleges.6 To put
3Authors’ estimates for eight state universities indicate that the SAT and high school GPA are the dominant
determinants of college admission, with a one standard deviation increase in SAT score increasing the probability of
admission by an average of 17 percentage points.
4A natural concern is that changes in portfolio composition and exam performance over time are caused by a
concurrent time-varying factor such as performance in high school. This is alleviated by the fact that students select
their pre-exam portfolios shortly before taking the SAT, so the pre-exam portfolio should already reflect time-varying
factors concurrent with SAT performance.
5The model is most closely related to those in Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Lange
(2007). The updating that occurs as students’ scores are released shares similarities to the updating by employers
as they observe the performance of employees (Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo, 2010; Rockoff et al., 2012; Kahn and
Lange 2014). Student updating plays a significant role in theoretical models of college choice (Manski, 1989; Altonji,
1993; Altonji, Blom, and Meghir, 2012).
6Figure 1 presents the distribution of SAT scores, which have a standard deviation of 200 points, and college
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this in perspective, consider two students who anticipate getting the same SAT score but apply
to colleges with average scores of 1100 and 1200, respectively. The gap in selectivity for college
selected after scores are released only closes by 5 points if the less ambitious student scores 100
points higher on the exam. The magnitude of updating is smaller when considering the overall
composition of the portfolio, as about half of colleges are selected prior to the exam. That is, a
one standard deviation SAT score shock results in an approximately 0.05 standard deviation shift
in the selectivity of a student’s overall portfolio. In contrast, 100 points on the SAT is correlated
with an approximately 20 point, or 0.4 standard deviation, difference in portfolio selectivity in a
cross-sectional regression that conditions on a rich set of covariates. The magnitudes indicate that
inertia due to factors such as parental knowledge and financial resources result in new information
closing a small fraction of the portfolio gap evident across students. There is a similar pattern of
effects in terms of sign and magnitude for a wide range of college characteristics. For example, a
positive score shock increases the fraction of private colleges selected in the post exam period by 1
percentage point and the average annual tuition by 400 dollars.
The estimates for students who take the exam two times may be even more convincing, as
there are multiple within-student treatments. The composition of colleges selected after the release
of the first score more closely reflect that score and likewise for colleges selected after the release of
the second score.7 Importantly, the results indicate that students do not incorporate information
from the second score when only the first score has been released, supporting the validity of the
empirical design. Those who receive positive shocks appear to alter their portfolios more than
those who receive negative shocks. This is consistent with evidence that changes in the portfolio
are driven by students applying more aggressively to “reach” colleges with little change in the least
selective “safety” colleges. Interestingly, heterogeneity analysis does not indicate that the average
effects obscure larger responses from sensitive subgroups. Updating is similar in magnitude for
students from high and low income households, for males and females, and for students of different
races.
The literature has frequently found that students alter human capital investment in response
to perceived returns and expectations (Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009; Jensen, 2010; Jacob and
Linkow, 2011; Abramitzky and Lavy, 2014). Papay, Murnane, and Willett (2016) find updating
based on the labels assigned to No Child Left Behind test scores, while Dizon-Ross (2014) finds
that parental perceptions of child aptitude affect human capital investment. Conversely, Card and
Krueger (2005) find no effect of eliminating affirmative action on the portfolios of minority students
despite reducing the likelihood of admission. The finding that SAT scores play a modest role in
shaping college choice is consistent with results in the literature that college choices are partially a
function of non-academic factors such as the availability of college counseling services (Avery and
portfolios, which have a standard deviation of 110 points.
7To abstract from selection into taking the SAT one or two times, the identification design is replicated using a
merged sample of one and two-time takers. The resulting estimates closely mirror those found when considering the
two groups separately. On the extensive margin, students who experience a score shock with a magnitude of 100
points are less than one percentage point more likely to send reports to additional colleges. So students who update
the most do not appear to be over or under represented in the analysis.
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Kane 2004; Carrell and Sacerdote, 2012; Oreopoulos and Ford, 2016), information about the cost of
college (Bettinger et al., 2012; Hoxby and Turner, 2014), ease of access to entrance exams (Klasik,
2013; Hurwitz et al., 2014; Goodman, 2014; Bulman, 2015), and mismatch between students and
colleges (Hoxby and Avery, 2012; Smith, Pender, and Howell, 2013; Dillon and Smith, 2016).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the policy and new administrative data
used to conduct the analysis. Section 3 introduces an empirical framework of student updating and
identifies several testable implications. Section 4 presents the primary specifications and results.
Section 5 discusses the implications of the findings.
2 SAT Scores and College Score Reports
This paper examines if students update their college portfolios in response to new information
about the strength of their applications and college readiness. Panel data provides an opportunity
to factor out unobserved, time-invariant individual and household characteristics and beliefs that
influence college choices.8 There are, however, two fundamental challenges for employing a panel
data approach in this and related contexts. First, in the typical progression, students only choose
one college application portfolio, which is not conducive to observing changes over time. Second, a
panel data approach requires new information that is not anticipated by students and is observed
by the researcher. While students may receive large positive and negative shocks when their SAT
score is released, this is of little use if the researcher cannot account for students’ prior expectations.
This paper exploits a unique policy and a rich new dataset from the College Board to es-
timate the effect of information shocks generated by SAT scores on college choices. We exploit
administrative data that include the exact timing of when students send score reports to colleges
and a College Board pricing policy that induces students to select some colleges to receive their
SAT score before they take the exam. While a student has only one college application portfolio,
they construct this portfolio by selecting colleges before and after they take the SAT. Our panel
therefore consists of information periods: the portfolio selected before taking the exam, and the
portfolio selected after scores have been released. Nearly half of students take the exam a second
time. This generates a third information period in which students may update in response to the
second SAT. Multi-time takers also provide a natural test of the extent to which students anticipate
scores, as we can measure if they appear to respond to future scores that have not been released.
8Estimating the importance of aptitude is inherently problematic in cross-sectional data. The choice of where to
apply is a function of many student and household characteristics. Some of these characteristics are both observable
and measurable (household income, parental education, student grade point average, and geographic location), but
may not be included in a single data source. Many other characteristics are difficult to measure or are unlikely to
be included in any data source (e.g. parental expectations, parental familiarity with the college application process,
student motivation, resources of extended family, high school quality, peer effects). If any of these characteristics is
correlated with both the measure of student aptitude and college choice, then the estimated effects in a cross-sectional
analysis will be biased.
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2.1 SAT and Score Report Data
The SAT is a college entrance exam administered by the College Board that is taken by high school
students across the United States, typically in their junior or senior years. The exam is comprised of
math and critical reading sections scored between 200 and 800, so students can receive a combined
score between 400 and 1600.9 Each section was normalized to have a mean score of 500 and a
standard deviation of 110 in 1995. Students are permitted to take the SAT more than one time.
This analysis focuses on years prior to 2009 during which each of a student’s scores is reported to
a college. In later years, Score Choice policies allowed students to pick and choose scores to be
sent to colleges, which significantly complicates the empirical design needed to measure updating.
Along with student scores on each SAT attempt, the data contain scores for the Preliminary SAT
/ National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test (PSAT), which is a lower-stakes version of the SAT
taken in one’s sophomore or junior year of high school. The College Board also administers a
questionnaire upon exam registration that includes information on high school GPA, race, parental
income, high school attended, and home zip code.
Our analysis relies on observing student Score Sends, which are official SAT reports that
students have sent to colleges for consideration in the admissions process. A score report includes
each of a student’s SAT scores. The reports provide a measure of student interest in colleges
and previous studies have argued that they are a reasonable proxy for applications (Card and
Krueger, 2005; Pallais, 2015). Score Sends are especially advantageous for measuring updating in
this setting as they reveal intended application portfolios, regardless of whether students complete
these applications after scores are released. For example, a student who chooses to send her score to
an elite college prior to taking the SAT may not apply after receiving a lower than expected score.
This updating would be obscured if only completed applications were observed. The score report
data identify the college to which the report is directed. Each report sent to a four-year college
is merged with college characteristics from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (NCES IPEDS).10 The data also include the exact date that
students request each report. When registering for the SAT, students have the option to send their
scores to four colleges for no additional cost. This must be done within nine days of taking the
exam, so a high fraction of takers send reports prior to the exam. After the ten day period (or for
additional reports prior to the ten day expiration), scores may be sent for a fee of approximately
11 dollars each. Students from lower income households are eligible to send additional reports
for free. During the period of analysis, reports sent to colleges include every score earned by the
student, though colleges do not automatically receive a new report if a student retakes the exam.11
A student may send a report more than one time to the same college, which is particularly common
9A writing section was introduced in 2005 but not all students take this section and not all colleges use it in the
admissions process.
10Some colleges, typically two-year colleges or specialty colleges (e.g. religious or arts) do not report all of the
measures of selectivity used in this analysis.
11Score Choice was adopted in the spring of 2009, whereby students could choose which SAT scores to send if there
were multiple administrations.
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among those who improve their scores.
For students who took the SAT once, we divide score reports into those requested before
taking the exam and those requested after the scores are released.12 We calculate the average
characteristics of the colleges in each of these two periods, including the SAT scores of matriculating
students, in-state tuition, graduation rate, and fraction private. We note that reports may be
selected during three periods for students who took the exam twice: those selected prior to the first
exam; those selected after the first score is released but before the second exam is taken, including
reports that are free with the second registration; and those selected after the second exam scores
are released. We calculate the average characteristics of the colleges in each of the three periods.
2.2 Population for Analysis
The analysis is based on the population of students who took the SAT between 2007 and 2009
and who sent at least one score report prior to taking the SAT.13 The PSAT is taken by more
than 75 percent of SAT takers and provides students with a measure of how they may perform.
Approximately 75 percent of SAT takers send at least one free score report to a college prior to
taking the exam and nearly two-thirds of these students use all four of their free reports. The
reports allow us to observe the types of colleges a student is considering prior to receiving their
score. Analysis of revised portfolio composition is conditional on students sending score reports
after taking the SAT. We explicitly estimate the determinants of sending additional reports and
discuss the implications for interpreting the estimates.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for demographic characteristics and test scores in the
sample. Over 627,000 students took the SAT once and 534,000 took it twice. Approximately 46
percent are males and 59 percent are white. Mean PSAT scores are about 100, which is approxi-
mately equivalent to a 1000 on the SAT. Students who took the SAT once have an average score
of 1009, while students who took it twice average a 1038 and 1064 for the first and second sittings.
Approximately 21 percent of one-time takers sent scores after the exam and 32 percent of two-time
takers did so after the second exam.
2.3 Within-Student Variation in Scores
There is significant within-student variation in scores earned on the PSAT and the first and second
taking of the SAT. This variation is important for two reasons. First, unpredictable variation
in scores generates the information shocks necessary for the identification of portfolio updating.
Second, the magnitude of the variation determines the importance of updating in practice.
The top graph in Figure 2 presents the distribution of the differences between each students’
first SAT score and their PSAT score. The mean is close to 0 and the standard deviation of the
12Score Sends requests are delayed until new scores are available, so the analysis is based on the request date rather
than the fulfillment date. Requests that come immediately after the exam is taken but before the scores are released
are excluded. Such requests are relatively uncommon and are excluded due to the fact that they may reflect partial
treatment (as the student has taken the exam but not seen his or her score).
13The choice of cohorts is determined by the availability of data that include the date when score reports are sent.
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difference is 85.6 points. Note that this within-student variation is nearly one-half the standard
deviation of 190 points across students. A student who earns a 1000 on the PSAT has an approx-
imately 30 percent chance of earning a score lower than a 900 or greater than 1100 on the SAT.
To examine the extent to which other factors may help to explain this variation, we generate a
predicted SAT score using a rich set of observables in addition to the PSAT, including pre-exam
portfolio selectivity, high school GPA, and demographic characteristics.14 The bottom graph in
Figure 2 presents the difference between each student’s actual and predicted SAT score. The stan-
dard deviation of the difference is 80.5 points. That is, the rich set of characteristics provides
essentially no additional explanatory power for predicting the SAT beyond the PSAT. The PSAT
score is the most important predictor of a student’s SAT score for the researcher (and perhaps the
student as well) and that there is significant within-student variation in exam scores.
Within-student variation in scores is also evident when students take the SAT multiple times.
The top graph in Figure 3 presents the distribution of the differences between students’ first and
second scores. The standard deviation of the difference is 70.3 points. This variation is especially
interesting considering that the exams are, by design, equally difficult and cover the same body of
knowledge. Note that while students perform slightly better on average the second time they take
the exam (the mean of the difference is 26 points), this increase is small relative to the variation in
scores. Nearly 40 percent of students earn a lower score when they take the exam a second time.
This is notable as repeat takers have additional time for test preparation, experience taking the
exam, and may have chosen to retake in part because they believe that they had a bad draw the
first time. This is consistent with there being significant and unpredictable noise in performance.
We predict each student’s second score use all observables listed above in addition to the first SAT
score. The resulting differences are presented in the bottom graph in Figure 3. The standard
deviation of the difference is 63.6 points. That is, even with two measures of prior SAT scores
in hand, the PSAT and the first SAT, realized performance varies considerably from predicted
performance.
We supplement this descriptive evidence that SAT scores are difficult to anticipate with
explicit estimates of test score anticipation in Section 4. The analysis exploits the realization that
if students anticipate their scores, then future scores will be incorporated into current portfolio
choice. There is little evidence that this is the case, supporting the assumption that the score
shocks observed by the researcher are highly correlated with the true score shocks experienced by
students.
14Specifically, the predicted SAT score is estimated using a fixed effect for each possible PSAT score; an indicator
for whether the student took the PSAT as a sophomore or junior; a cubic polynomial in the selectivity of pre-SAT
portfolio (as measured by the average SAT score of matriculating students); fixed effects for high school grade point
average; gender; fixed effects for race; fixed effects for parental income level; and a fixed effect for the year the exam
was taken.
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3 Empirical Framework
We develop an empirical model that highlights several important considerations for interpreting the
reduced form estimates. Intuitively, updating should result in positive coefficients on scores as they
are released (i.e. students give weight to information as it becomes observable). The revelation of
SAT scores should reduce students’ reliance on other measures of aptitude, resulting in negative
coefficients on factors such as PSAT scores and high school GPA. Less intuitively, the model shows
that the reduced form estimates may understate the extent to which students incorporate SAT
scores into their college portfolios. This occurs if students use information unobservable to the
researcher to anticipate their scores. In the case of students who take the exam multiple times,
the magnitude of this downward bias can be estimated explicitly. Specifically, when only the first
SAT score has been released, the coefficient on the second SAT score reflects the bias term. The
not-yet-released second SAT score provides a placebo test for the validity of the design. Additional
predictions of the model serve to validate the identification design. For example, if SAT scores are
essentially random draws relative to a true, latent score, then the first and second score should be
equally predictive of portfolios prior to either being released.
3.1 Student Updating
The empirical model is analogous to the employer learning literature (Farber and Gibbons ,1996;
Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Lange, 2007) but with students updating their portfolios in response to
receiving new information from the SAT. We present the model for a student who takes the exam
twice, which accounts for one time takers as a special case.15 A student forms beliefs about her
optimal college application portfolio which can be summarized by a single continuous measure of
quality y.16 The optimal portfolio is a function of four components: s is a set of characteristics
observable to the student and the researcher (e.g. PSAT scores); q are characteristics observable
to the student, but not the researcher (e.g. personal essays); z is the true SAT score that a
student would receive in the absence of measurement error; and η are characteristics unobservable
to the student and the researcher (e.g. confidential letters of recommendation).17 Without loss of
generality, we impose that η is uncorrelated with z.18 The distribution of (s, q, z, η) is assumed to
15The framework can be applied to students who take the SAT three or more times. The predictions extend
naturally, but in practice a modest fraction of students take the exam more than two times during this period.
16We abstract from the method by which a student determines the optimal portfolio and only assume that there
is a monotonic relationship between the quality of a portfolio and student characteristics. For theoretical treatments
of the portfolio choice problem see, for example, Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006), Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2011),
and Fu (2014).
17The model differentiates between a true SAT score and the score a student actually receives as this allows the
full set of SAT scores to matter for the application decision for individuals who take the SAT multiple times. As
our analysis focuses on years prior to score choice, students understand that colleges observe and may use the full
set of SAT scores for admissions decisions. For students who take the exam only once, imposing that there is no
measurement error and that the received score is equal to z would have no consequences for the results.
18In other words, z contains all the information about a student’s desirability to colleges that he or she does not
initially know but can learn from SAT performance, while η contains all of the information that students do not
initially know and cannot learn from SAT performance.
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be jointly normal with non-negative correlations across vectors. This assumption has been made
previously in the literature (e.g. Lange, 2007), makes the model tractable, and there are several
opportunities in the empirical analysis to examine if it is reasonable.19 The optimal portfolio for
student i is assumed to be linear in each of these elements,
yi = δqi + rsi + Λzi + ηi (1)
which is normalized to be in units of optimal portfolio choice as it has no natural scale.
Students select colleges in t = 0 without knowing either SAT score, receive their first score
in t = 1 and choose a new portfolio of colleges, and receive their second score in t = 2 and choose
a portfolio with full knowledge of all scores. Beginning in t = 0, students form expectations about
their unobserved factors z and η using observed factors s and q. It follows from joint normality
that these expectations will be
z = E[z|s, q] + ν = γ1q + γ2s+ ν
η = E[η|s, q] + e = α1q + α2s+ e
where e and ν are mean zero normal random variables with variances σ2e and σ
2
ν , and E[se] =
E[sν] = E[qν] = 0. The student then uses these beliefs to select an optimal period 0 application
portfolio,
y0 = Ω0E[y|s, q] (2)
= Ω0 [(δ + α1 + Λγ1)q + (r + α2 + Λγ2)s]
The weight the student places on her observable characteristics s and q is the sum of their direct
effect on the choice of portfolio (δ and r), their role in inferring unobservable characteristics η that
affect portfolio choice (α1 and α2), and their role in predicting the unobserved SAT score (γ1 and
γ2) weighted by the importance of the SAT (Λ). Here Ω0 is a scaling factor that allows for the
possibility that application strategies may be correlated with aptitude. Estimation of Ω is discussed
in Section 3.3.
Prior to choosing colleges in period 1, the student observes her score, z1, which acts as a
signal of the true SAT: z1 = z+  where  is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ
2
 .
Using this information, the student forms a new belief of z,
E[z|s, q, z1] = pi1z1 + (1− pi1)(γ1q + γ2s) (3)
where pit = σ
2
ν/(σ
2
 + tσ
2
ν), which follows from Bayesian updating with a normally distributed prior
and t normally distributed signals. Using these beliefs, the student chooses her optimal portfolio
19If the normality assumption is violated, then all of the expectations become linear projections and the signs of
the predictions still hold. The joint normality assumption is only necessary for calculating the extent of test score
anticipation.
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in period 1,
y1 = E[y|s, q, z1] (4)
= [δ + α1 + Λ(1− pi1)γ1] q + [r + α2 + Λ(1− pi1)γ2] s+ Λpi1z1
Relative to y0, the introduction of z1 causes the student to reduce her reliance on q and s for
predicting z (evident from the 1 − pi1 term) and places weight on the score z1. In period 2, the
student observes her second SAT score, z2, and uses all available information to form a belief about
z.
E[z|s, q, z1, z2] = pi2z1 + pi2z2 + (1− 2pi2)(γ1q + γ2s) (5)
She then chooses her optimal application portfolio,
y2 = E[y|s, q, z1, z2] (6)
= [r + α2 + Λγ2(1− 2pi2)] s+ [δ + α1 + Λγ1(1− 2pi2)] q + Λpi2z1 + Λpi2z2
Note that the student further reduces her reliance on other factors.
3.2 Empirical Model
In practice, we observe s and the two test scores, z1 and z2. The expectation of q, which we do not
observe, conditional on the observed test scores is E[q|s, z1, z2] = [γ3 + γ4(1− 2φ2)] s + γ4φ2z1 +
γ4φ2z2 where φ2 is the standard coefficient from Bayesian updating with two i.i.d. normal signals.
Regressing y0 on s, z1, and z2 implies the linear projection,
E∗[Ω0E[y|s, q]|s, z1, z2] = a0s+ b0z1 + c0z2 (7)
where,
a0 ≡ Ω0 (r + α2 + [δ + α1][γ3 + γ4(1− 2φ2)] + Λ[γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2)])
b0 ≡ Ω0 [(δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λγ1γ4φ2]
c0 ≡ Ω0 [(δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λγ1γ4φ2]
The magnitude of the coefficients on z1 and z2 depend on the extent to which the scores are
correlated with unobservables q that predict a student’s score.20 Note that the coefficients on the
SAT scores are equal in the pre-exam period, so future scores are equally predictive of pre-exam
portfolios. This follows if the scores are i.i.d. draws from the distribution of the true latent score.
Estimating the same regression for y1 yields,
E∗[Ω1E[y|s, q, z1]|s, z1, z2] ≡ a1s+ b1z1 + c1z2 (8)
20Specifically, δ is the direct weight a student places on q to determine the optimal portfolio, α1 reflects the use of
q to predict unobserved factors, and γ1 measures the extent to which students use q to predict their true SAT score.
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where,
a1 ≡ Ω1 (r + α2 + [δ + α1][γ3 + γ4(1− 2φ2)] + Λ(1− pi1)(γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2)))
b1 ≡ Ω1 [(δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λ(1− pi1)γ1γ4φ2 + Λpi1]
c1 ≡ Ω1 [(δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λ(1− pi1)γ1γ4φ2]
Of note is that the difference between the coefficient on the first and second SAT score is Λpi1. That
is, the coefficient on the second SAT score, which has not been released, captures the attenuating
effect of unobservables. The additional effect of the first SAT score, which the student knows, is the
effect of new information. After estimating Ω0 and Ω1, we can compare the regression coefficients.
The following expressions correspond to the reduced form coefficients in the primary specification.
A10 =
a1
Ω1
− a0
Ω0
= −pi1Λ [γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2)]
B10 =
b1
Ω1
− b0
Ω0
= pi1Λ(1− γ1γ4φ2)
C10 =
c1
Ω1
− c0
Ω0
= −pi1Λγ1γ4φ2
If students optimally adjust their college portfolio in response to their SAT score, there will be an
increase in the coefficient on z1 and a decrease in the coefficient vector on s in period 1 relative
to period 0. Released scores reduce the student’s reliance on the PSAT and high school GPA.
The model also highlights that the estimated effect of the SAT is biased downward to the extent
that students accurately anticipate their future scores using unobservable factors as reflected in
the γ1γ4φ2 term.
21 The coefficient on the second SAT score, C10, measures the magnitude of this
attenuation.22 Thus the difference B10 − C10 is the effect of a student observing her SAT score on
portfolio choice after adjusting for anticipation.
Now consider the regression of y2 on s, z1, and z2. The linear projection yields,
E∗[E[y|s, q, z1, z2]|s, z1, z2] ≡ a2s+ b2z1 + c2z2 (9)
where,
a2 ≡ r + α2 + (δ + α1)[γ3 + γ4(1− 2φ2)] + Λ(1− 2pi2)(γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2))
b2 ≡ (δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λ(1− 2pi2)γ1γ4φ2 + Λpi2
c2 ≡ (δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λ(1− 2pi2)γ1γ4φ2 + Λpi2
21Intuitively, the coefficient on the SAT scores is inflated in the baseline period due to the omitted variables q.
After a score has been released, the student relies less on q to predict their true score z. If the student only cares
about the first realized score, then the student no longer uses q to predict the score. As a result, the estimate of
updating B10 is attenuated. In the model, γ1 reflects the extent to which students can predict their true score z,
while γ4 captures the correlation between q and the true score.
22There will be a shifting away from future information z2 to the extent that the student used unobservable
information q to predict z and relies on this less after observing z1.
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Comparing these coefficients to the period 0 estimates,
A20 = a2 − a0
Ω0
= −2pi2Λ [γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2)]
B20 = b2 − b0
Ω0
= pi2Λ(1− 2γ1γ4φ2)
C20 = c2 − c0
Ω0
= pi2Λ(1− 2γ1γ4φ2)
With all scores available to the student, the cumulative portfolio become a function of both z1
and z2. The more scores that have been released, the less other factors used to predict the scores
matter. As in the pre-exam period, the coefficients on the first and second SAT scores are equal.
This provides an additional testable implication of the model.
3.3 Time-Dependent Strategies
For convenience, we have assumed that we know Ωt, the extent to which application strategies
change throughout the application process across students of differing aptitude. There is a simple
way to estimate each Ωt. Consider a regression of yt on s, the time-invariant information about
ability that is available to both the student and researcher in all periods. As originally shown
by Farber and Gibbons (1996), this estimate will simply be E∗[ΩtE[y|s]|s] = ΩtE∗[y|s] where the
equality follows from the law of iterated projections.23 If the coefficient vector on s changes in
different time periods, it can only be attributed to changes in strategy. We estimate this using a
series of regressions,
yt = dts+ t (10)
The estimate of Ωt is then Ωˆt =
dt
dT
, where T is the time period for which we wish to normalize the
scale (period 1 for one-time takers and period 2 for two-time takers). In simple terms, regressing
portfolio changes in each period on PSAT scores reveals the typical strategy of students of differing
baseline aptitudes.
4 Estimates of Student Updating
Nearly every student considering attending a four-year college takes a college entrance exam and
the SAT is a primary determinant of admissions at most colleges. Thus the revelation of scores may
be the single largest academic information shock that students experience, especially with respect
to shaping college choice. We employ a difference-in-differences style design to estimate if, and to
what extent, students update their portfolios in response to observing their scores. As revealed by
the model in Section 3, portfolio updating will generate positive coefficients on scores after they are
released and negative coefficients on academic measures previously used to predict scores. Two-
time takers provide an explicit test of, and correction for, the extent to which students anticipate
23Note that because of the normality assumptions, the linear projection and the conditional expectation are the
same thing, so the law of iterated expectations also applies.
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future scores. The primary outcome of interest is college selectivity as measured by the average
SAT scores of matriculates. Additional outcomes presented include tuition levels, graduation rates,
private and public status, and selectivity ratings.24 We present outcomes based on characteristics
of new colleges added to the portfolio in each period and the average of all colleges in the portfolio
(i.e. the cumulative portfolio).25
4.1 Cross-Sectional Differences
Table 2 presents the cross-sectional relationship of portfolio selectivity with academic and non-
academic factors. The resulting coefficients provide baseline context for the causal estimates. We
regress college portfolio selectivity (as measured by the average SAT score of matriculating stu-
dents) on a student’s PSAT score, SAT score, and observable characteristics including gender, race,
household income, and high school attended. As noted, the resulting estimate will be biased by
unobservables. For one time takers, a 100 point difference in SAT score is correlated with a 20 point
difference in selectivity. Thus a one standard deviation in exam score is correlated with an approx-
imately 0.4 standard deviation difference in portfolio selectivity. Among two-time takers, each 100
points on the second SAT is correlated with an 18 point difference in portfolio selectivity. High
school grade point average and socio-economic factors are also strongly correlated with the college
portfolios students select. A one point change in grade point average, the difference between an A
and B high school student, is correlated with a difference of 30 to 50 points in portfolio selectivity.
After controlling for student scores and grades, the difference in portfolio selectivity for households
with income between 50,000 and 100,000 dollars relative to those with more than 100,000 dollars
is about 7 points.
4.2 One-Time Takers: Updating
In the case of students who take the exam one time, we use the following specification,
yit = β0 + β1si + β2z1i + β31t=1 + β4si1t=1 + β5z1i1t=1 + it (11)
where, for simplicity, we can think of si as a student’s PSAT score (though we also include household
income, high school grade point average, gender, race, and geographic location in the specification),
z1 is the student’s SAT score, and 1t=1 is an indicator for the report being sent after the score is
24Black and Smith (2006) detail the potential pitfalls of using a single measure of college quality. With this in mind,
we present a range of outcomes and also consider a college quality index based on factor analysis. The use of ordinal
variables, such as happiness and test scores, in the left-hand side of regressions has come under criticism by Bond and
Lang (2013, 2014). Our results are robust to multiple polynomial transformations of our quality measure, including
both highly left-skewed and highly-right skewed transformations. We will also analyze other quality measures and
find similar results, providing additional evidence that our results are not due to arbitrary scaling.
25A student who initially believes she is a high type, may reassess downward after receiving a negative score shock.
She may respond to this by applying to additional schools that are of the appropriate level given her new beliefs about
her aptitude. Alternatively, she may overcompensate and apply to even less selective schools in order to balance her
prior mistake, resulting in a portfolio average that she believes is appropriate.
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released. The outcomes yit are the average characteristics of the colleges selected before and after
the score is known to the student, with one observation per student per period.26
If students update their portfolios to reflect SAT scores then β5 > 0. The point estimates
understate updating if students are able to predict their true scores using unobservables. In other
words, if the deviation of SAT scores from PSAT scores are essentially random shocks, then the
estimates will not be downward biased. The distribution of PSAT, first SAT, and second SAT
scores presented in Section 2 was suggestive that scores are indeed quite noisy in the sense that
they vary dramatically within student and are difficult to predict based on observables. Those who
take the exam two times provide an opportunity to explicitly estimate the extent to which students
anticipate future scores.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 present the results for new colleges added to the portfolio. The
estimates are consistent with updating in response to new information, as students adjust their
portfolios to reflect their SAT scores after they are released (i.e. colleges selected after the release
are more closely aligned with the new scores than those selected prior). In column (1), which
includes a rich set of student characteristics, the point estimates indicate that a 100 point increase
in SAT score leads to a 7 point increase in the selectivity of application portfolios. This point
estimate is roughly unchanged when we include zip code fixed effects in column (2) and high school
fixed effects in column (3), in both cases interacting the fixed effects with a period indicator to
account for changes in portfolio composition that are common to a school or community. Thus a
one standard deviation increase in SAT score leads to a 0.12 standard deviation in college selectivity
for newly selected colleges.27
In column (5) we estimate the effect of student updating in terms of the cumulative selectivity
of the portfolio. The change in the cumulative portfolio is perhaps most important for understand-
ing the extent to which the score shocks are reflected in college choice. The estimates indicate that
students update in response to new information, but the overall changes are much smaller (as col-
leges selected prior to the exam do not change). A 100 point positive shock to SAT score leads to an
increase in the selectivity of one’s application portfolio of 2.9 SAT points. That is, a one standard
deviation shift in score changes the selectivity of a student’s portfolio by 0.05 standard deviations.
By comparison, the cross-sectional estimate with controls indicates that a one standard deviation
26The coefficients β1 and β2 correspond to a0 and b0 in the empirical model. The coefficient β4 represents A10,
the change in the coefficient on the PSAT after the SAT score is released, and β5 represents B10, the change in the
coefficient on the SAT. A natural alternative to our specification is a first-differenced specification in which the change
in the college portfolio is regressed on the change in the score (SAT − PSAT ). We prefer a difference-in-differences
design because it does not assume that changes in the SAT and PSAT are given equal weight by the student and the
design is naturally extended to the case of two-time takers. The identification design is not sensitive to time-varying
factors such as performance in high school, participation in test preparation classes, or changes in motivation. This
is due to the fact that students choose their pre-exam college portfolios shortly prior to taking the SAT, whereas the
post-exam portfolios are selected after scores are released. Therefore, the pre-exam portfolio and not the post-exam
portfolio should be correlated with time-varying factors that cause positive or negative performance shocks on exam
day.
27We note that this estimate will be downward biased to the extent that students accurately anticipate changes
in their scores. As discussed in the previous section, measurement error in SAT scores, and our rich set of student
controls imply that this bias is likely to be small. Two time takers allow us to estimate this explicitly and reveals
little score anticipation.
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difference in score is correlated with a 0.4 standard deviation difference in portfolio quality. So the
causal estimate is a small fraction of the naive cross-sectional estimate. This high level of inertia in
college application portfolios challenges the assumption that academic determinants of admissions
are the primary determinants of college choices. The fact that students select a large fraction of
colleges for their portfolios prior to taking the exam (due to the availability of free reports) appears
to reduce the alignment between portfolios and strength of applications.
Of course, it is possible that individuals only apply to safety schools before they receive
their SAT and their reach schools afterwards, or vice-versa. If higher ability individuals have the
same safety schools but better reach schools than lower ability individuals, this could cause us to
spuriously overstate student updating. In Section 3.3, we showed how to correct for this using time-
variance in the correlation between portfolios and measures of aptitude that are always observable
to the student. The estimates of Ωt are presented in Appendix A and indicate that higher ability
students tend to be somewhat more aggressive with their post-exam applications than lower ability
students. Columns (4) and (6) of Table 3 present results that are adjusted by this omega factor.28
The resulting estimates of student responsiveness to their scores are slightly smaller than those
from the unadjusted specification.
There is a similar pattern of effects when considering other measures of portfolio composition
as shown in Table 4. The least selective college chosen after the score is released does not appear
to be sensitive to the score shock, but the most selective is. This suggests that students may apply
to a set of safety schools regardless of their SAT performance. Higher SAT score shocks result in
students selecting a slightly higher fraction of private colleges, colleges with higher average tuition,
and colleges with higher graduation rates.29 For example, students who score 100 points higher
on the SAT appear to add new colleges with in-state tuition that is 400 dollars greater per year.
Average in-state tuition for public universities during this period is 6,900 dollars, while average
tuition across all universities is 13,250 dollars. The estimates for each characteristic of the portfolio
reflect decreased importance placed on the PSAT after the SAT score is released. Time-varying
strategy adjusted estimates for each outcome are presented in Appendix A. They closely mirror
the unadjusted estimates in terms of both sign and magnitude, indicating that the results are not
due to stronger students employing systematically different application patterns.
4.3 Two-Time Takers: Updating
Students who take the SAT more than one time provide especially compelling evidence of the pat-
tern and magnitude of updating. Observing the responses to multiple shocks necessarily increases
the credibility of estimates, as the probability that some unobserved, time-varying confounder would
coincide with the treatment on multiple occasions is quite low. Further, the second score acts as a
natural test of bias during the period when only the first score has been released.
28As these regressions use variables modified by a scalar imputed from the same dataset and sample, we calculate
our standard errors via bootstrapping.
29The pattern of effects is nearly identical when considering additional outcomes such as six year graduation rate,
Barron’s selectivity ratings, and a college selectivity index based on factor analysis.
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Students who take the SAT twice receive two information shocks and send reports during
three periods. The specification is,
yit = β0 + β1si + β2z1i + β3z2i + β41t=1 + β51t=2 (12)
+β6si1t=1 + β7z1i1t=1 + β8z2i1t=1
+β9si1t=2 + β10z1i1t=2 + β11z2i1t=2 + it
where z1i and z2i are the student’s first and second SAT scores. The coefficients β7 and β11 represent
the change in the coefficient on the first and second SAT scores after each is released. The coefficients
β6 and β9 represent the corresponding reduction in importance of the PSAT. Importantly, the
coefficient β8 on the second SAT score when only the first score is known measures the extent to
which students anticipate their scores using unobservables. As shown in Section 3, the difference
β7 − β8 is pi1Λ, the unbiased estimate of updating in response to the SAT.
The results in Table 5 are consistent with students updating their college portfolios in response
to SAT scores. Newly selected colleges in the period after the first score is released reflect that
score. Importantly, colleges selected during this period do not reflect the yet-to-be released second
score. This can be viewed as a placebo test that would reveal bias in the design. The magnitude of
the response to the first SAT score for newly selected colleges is about 5 points per 100, while the
magnitude of response to the second SAT score is about 7 points per 100. These estimates are quite
similar to those for one time takers. Thus the magnitude of the response is quite modest given
the importance of the SAT for determining likely admissions outcomes at more and less selective
colleges. As predicted by the model, students rely less on the PSAT after the first score is known,
and further reduce this reliance after the second score is known.
The strategy adjusted specification in column (4) has no indication that students choose more
or less selective college in response to the second SAT score during the period when only the first
score has been released. The coefficient on this exam provides a direct measure of downward bias
stemming from students anticipating future scores. That is, we do not find evidence that students
are able to anticipate their scores in such a way that it significantly biases the estimates. This is
consistent with the noisy within-student distribution of scores presented in Section 2. Subtracting
the bias from the coefficient on the first SAT produces the unbiased causal estimate of updating.
With this adjustment, a 100 point positive SAT score shock is estimated to cause a student to
increase her college portfolio selectivity by 4.5 points. Interestingly, students do not appear to use
information from the first SAT in choosing new colleges after receiving the second SAT score. That
is, students rely most heavily on new information when adjusting their portfolios.
The estimated effects of updating for the cumulative portfolio are presented in columns (5)
and (6). After the first score has been released and prior to the second score being released, only
the first score affects the portfolio. Adjusting for time-varying strategies, we see that a 100 point
shock on their first SAT score causes students to adjust their portfolio by 2 points. Note that the
bias generated by anticipation is only 0.1 points, as indicated by the coefficient on the second score.
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After both exams are known to the student, the first and second score have identical effects on the
cumulative portfolio. The estimates are nearly identical to those for one-time takers, revealing that
overall portfolios are only marginally updated in response to large shocks about the strength of a
student’s application.
Specification (6) provides additional support for the validity of the design. First, if SAT
scores are essentially random draws relative to a student’s expectations, then they should be given
equal weight prior to either being released.30 The estimated coefficients are 0.111 and 0.119 in
period 0 and a formal test fails to reject that they are equal. Second, after both scores are known,
each exam should be given equal additional weight for the cumulative portfolio. The coefficient
during this period are very similar with values of 0.015 and 0.014 and are not statistically different.
Table 6 presents alternate measures of portfolio composition.31 We again observe that the
increase in selectivity stems primarily from the most selective colleges, with the least selective
colleges remaining similar regardless of the shock. A 100 point increase in the first SAT score
results in a portfolio with 0.7 percentage points more private colleges and in-state tuition that is
300 dollars higher. Likewise, a positive score shock of 100 points on the second SAT produces an
increase the fraction of private colleges by 1.0 percentage points and tuition by 400 dollars. Positive
information shocks result in students selecting colleges that have slightly higher four-year graduation
rates. These findings are supported by specifications that adjust for time-varying strategies that
are correlated with aptitude as shown in Appendix A. Of particular note is that relative to the
pre-score period, only released scores are significantly incorporated into portfolio choice in each
period. This strongly supports the hypothesis that students do not anticipate their score shocks,
but that the effect of these shocks on college portfolios is modest.
4.4 Heterogeneity in Updating
Student responses to SAT scores may vary with gender, race, household resources, or the nature of
the information shock. That is, the modest average effects could obscure larger effects for population
subgroups that may be especially sensitive to new information about the types of colleges they are
likely to be admitted to. For example, students from higher or lower income households may respond
more or less to score shocks. Students whose parents are unfamiliar with the college application
process may respond less to an information shock if they apply to a fixed set of local colleges.
Conversely, lower incomes students may respond more if they rely on having multiple admissions
offers in order to negotiate for greater financial aid, if they prefer not to pay application fees for
colleges to which they may not be admitted, or if the SAT substitutes for other forms of college
counseling. The results in Table 7 indicate that students of all races and income ranges update in a
30Students pick period 0 colleges shortly before taking the SAT for the first time. If the student has some time-
specific insight about his or her performance on the exam at that time, then these colleges will be more closely
correlated with the first exam score than the second. Alternatively, if students retake the exam because their first
score did not align with their beliefs, then the second exam score may be more closely correlated with baseline
portfolios.
31As with the single test takers, we estimate these effects for newly selected colleges. Results using the cumulative
portfolio yield a similar pattern of results.
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way that is statistically significant but modest in magnitude. A specification with interacted effects
indicates that black students update more than white students, but that there are no significant
differences across income groups. Though male students have slightly larger coefficients than female
students, the differences in updating are not statistically significant.
Perhaps most interestingly, students who receive positive shocks, where the SAT exceeds the
predicted SAT, appear to be more responsive than students who receive negative shocks.32 This
is consistent with the finding that the change in portfolio quality is primarily driven by the most
selective colleges selected. Students may apply to safer schools regardless of their performance on
the SAT, but only those who receive unexpected positive news choose to add more selective colleges
to their portfolios. This is consistent with students being adverse to sending applications to colleges
to which they think they may not be admitted.
Table 8 presents estimates by subgroup for two-time takers. All groups exhibit a consistent
pattern with portfolios reflecting the first and second SAT as each is released. Newly released
first scores are highly significant and yet to be released second SAT scores are not. This supports
the hypothesis that no subgroup of students accurately anticipates future scores. For example, we
do not find that higher income students more accurately anticipate score shocks due to test prep
classes. Again, the results do not reveal strong heterogeneity. Only two of the findings for one-time
takers appear to carryover to students who take the exam twice: male students update more than
female students after the first and second scores are released, which is statistically significant in this
case; and those who receive two positive shocks update more than those who receive two negative
shocks.
4.5 Extensive Margin Retaking and Score Reports
There are two extensive margins of interest: taking the exam once or twice; and sending additional
reports after a score is released. We explicitly examine how student and household characteristics
and the size of the SAT information shock appear to affect these two margins. To abstract from
selection into retaking the exam, we merge one and two-time takers and replicate the primary
design. This exercise reveals that splitting the sample does not result in systematically smaller
estimates. While student responses to SAT scors are modest, we nonetheless estimate a lower
bound by assuming that all students who do not send additional reports did not update their
beliefs.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 indicate that students whose SAT score are lower than their
PSAT scores are more likely to retake the exam, while those whose SAT score exceeds their PSAT
scores are less likely to retake it.33 The magnitudes of these estimates are relatively modest, with
a 100 point negative shock only increasing the retake rate by 2 percentage points and a 100 point
positive shock decreasing the rate by 5 percentage points. By comparison, students from the
32See Section 2 for details about how the predicted SAT was estimated.
33See Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003) for an examination of retaking behavior among applicants to three selective
universities.
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highest income category are 9 percentage points more likely to take the exam than those in the
lowest income category. One- and two-time takers are treated separately in the empirical analysis
and have similar patterns of estimates. To ensure that separating the sample on this margin is not
biasing the results, we present estimates for the joint sample in Table 10. The results indicate that
a 100 point test score shock causes a 5.5 point increase in the average score of matriculates in the
college portfolio. This is consistent with the separate estimates presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
Because reports must be sent after the exam in order to measure updating, the results are
local to students who send more than the four free reports. While this is not a threat to the internal
validity of the design, it does affect the interpretation of the estimates. Specifically, students in
the sample used for analysis may have different socio-economic characteristics and may be more or
less sensitive to new information than the population of all SAT takers. The decision to have more
than four colleges in one’s portfolio may be determined by factors unrelated to the newly released
score, such as household income or college readiness, or it may be a response to the amount that
beliefs are updated in response to the score shock. As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9,
students from higher income households and students with high grade point averages in high school
are significantly more likely to send additional score reports.34 These students are over-represented
in the sample. In contrast, the estimates do not reveal that students who update the most are
more or less likely to send additional score reports. Specifically, the coefficient on the magnitude of
the information shock, approximated by the absolute value of the difference between the SAT and
PSAT score, indicates that a 100 point shock changes the probability of sending additional reports
by less than one percentage point.35 So the amount of updating a student experiences as a result
of the exam does not significantly affect the number of colleges in her portfolio.36
The number of colleges a student includes in her portfolio appears to be primarily a function
of characteristics such as household income and performance in high school, and is only marginally
affected by updating in response to the score shock. We estimate the lower bound of student
response by assuming that all students who do not send additional reports did not update their
beliefs. In practice, this is done by replacing missing post-exam portfolios with pre-exam portfolios.
The resulting estimates are presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table 10. The estimates are
mechanically smaller than the primary estimates and exhibit the same pattern of updating.
34A one point increase in grade point average (on a 4 point scale) is correlated with an 8 percentage point higher
probability of adding colleges to a student’s portfolio. Students from households with income exceeding 100,000
dollars are 5 percentage points more likely to send additional reports than a student from a household with income
of less than 50,000 dollars.
35In terms of the overall number of reports sent to colleges, a 100 point score shock is estimated to increase the
size of the portfolio by 0.04 score reports.
36If students who update their beliefs the most are more (less) likely to send more reports, then the estimated effects
would over (under) represent the population average. The amount that students update their beliefs depends on the
interaction of two factors: the size of the information shock |SAT-PSAT| (which is observable), and sensitivity to new
information (which is not observable). The finding that |SAT − PSAT | has almost no effect on sending additional
reports does not support the theory that more or less sensitive students may not be systematically over-represented
in the analysis.
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5 Conclusion
We find consistent evidence that students adjust their portfolios in response to new information
about the strength of their applications. Information shocks associated with the SAT cause students
to apply to more selective colleges that charge higher tuition and have higher graduation rates.
However, the magnitude of the response is much too small to close the unexplained gaps between
students who appear to have similar academic qualifications. This indicates that it is difficult to
change students’ college choices even when providing them with new, highly relevant information
about their aptitude and probability of admission. The magnitude of the estimates is consistent
across students who take the exam one and two times. The results contribute revealed preference
based evidence to a growing literature that attempts to understand how students update their
human capital choices in response to information about academic aptitude and likelihood of success.
A point of significant policy interest is identifying ways to close the gap in outcomes between
students from higher and lower income households. College entrance exam results, which are re-
vealed to nearly all students considering a four-year college, provide students with standardized
feedback about their likelihood of admission and potential for success in college. The results in
this paper suggest that the SAT can play a role in bringing college portfolios into alignment with
academic performance. However, there is a significant amount of inertia in portfolio choice. The
cause of this inertia is an open question and ripe for future research, and appears to stem in part
from students selecting colleges prior to learning the strength of their applications. Alternatively,
students may not be skilled in translating SAT performance into college admissions predictions.
The magnitude of student updating may vary with both the timeliness and salience of new in-
formation about college choice. The answers to these questions may help to improve the way in
which students, parents, and school counselors receive and respond to critical information in the
application process.
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Figure 1: Distribution of SAT Scores and Portfolio Quality
A. Distribution of First SAT Scores
B. Distribution of Pre-Exam College Portfolios
Note: The top figure presents the score distribution of students’ first SAT scores. The score is measured in multiples
of 10 points. The standard deviation of the distribution is 200 points. The bottom figure presents the distribution of
the average SAT scores of matriculates of colleges in each students’ score report portfolio (one measure of portfolio
quality). The standard deviation of the distribution is 110 points.
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Figure 2: Within-Student Variation in Scores: First SAT vs PSAT and Predicted SAT
A. First SAT - PSAT
B. First SAT - Predicted First SAT
Note: The top figure presents the difference between a student’s SAT and PSAT scores. The PSAT score has been
multiplied by 10 to be on the same scale as the SAT. The standard deviation of the difference is 86.5 points. The
bottom figure presents the difference between the first SAT score and the predicted SAT. The SAT score is predicted
using the PSAT, grade point average, gender, race, parental income, and the average score for matriculates of colleges
selected to receive score reports prior to taking the exam. The standard deviation of the difference is 80.5 points.
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Figure 3: Within-Student Variation in Scores: Second SAT vs First SAT and Predicted SAT
A. Second SAT - First SAT
B. Second SAT - Predicted Second SAT
Note: The top figure presents the difference between a student’s second SAT and first SAT scores. The standard
deviation of the difference is 70.3 points. The bottom figure presents the difference between the second SAT score
and the predicted second SAT. The SAT score is predicted using the PSAT, first SAT, grade point average, gender,
race, parental income, and the average score for matriculates of colleges selected to receive score reports prior to
taking the exam. The standard deviation of the difference is 63.6 points.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
(1) (2) (3)
One-Time Takers
Male 627,190 0.470 0.499
White 627,190 0.588 0.492
Black 627,190 0.161 0.368
Hispanic 627,190 0.158 0.365
Other Race 627,190 0.093 0.290
PSAT score 627,190 972.0 208.6
Took PSAT as Junior 627,190 0.811 0.392
SAT Score 627,190 1009.3 213.5
Number Reports Before SAT 627,190 3.169 1.600
Sent Reports After SAT 627,190 0.206 0.404
Two-Time Takers
Male 534,399 0.452 0.498
White 534,399 0.604 0.489
Black 534,399 0.138 0.345
Hispanic 534,399 0.128 0.334
Other Race 534,399 0.131 0.337
PSAT Score 534,399 1010.8 192.1
Took PSAT as Junior 534,399 0.857 0.350
First SAT 534,399 1038.0 190.6
Second SAT 534,399 1064.4 196.6
Number Reports Before First SAT 534,399 3.674 1.859
Number Reports After First SAT 534,399 2.778 2.545
Sent Reports After First SAT 534,399 0.698 0.459
Sent Reports After Second SAT 534,399 0.324 0.468
Note: This table presents summary statistics for students who took the SAT one time (top panel) and two times
(bottom panel) and who took the PSAT as a sophomore or junior in high school. The cohorts included in the
analysis graduated between 2007 and 2009. “Reports” refer to Score Sends sent by the College Board to colleges
at the request of the student. Note that the PSAT score has been multiplied by 10 to be on a comparable scale
to the SAT score.
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Table 2: Cross-Sectional Correlates of Portfolio Quality
One-Time Taker Two-Time Taker
Colleges Chosen Colleges Chosen Colleges Chosen
After SAT After First SAT After Second SAT
(1) (2) (3)
SAT 1 Score 0.217*** 0.194*** 0.119***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
SAT 2 Score 0.184***
(0.004)
PSAT Score 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.043***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
High School GPA 50.052*** 40.738*** 50.400***
(0.623) (0.302) (0.558)
Male 3.949*** 8.293*** 0.410
(0.598) (0.280) (0.492)
Asian 32.117*** 30.919*** 26.533***
(1.174) (0.554) (0.844)
Black 10.700*** 12.917*** 18.361***
(1.131) (0.527) (0.990)
Hispanic 21.029*** 24.790*** 24.104***
(1.079) (0.539) (0.931)
Parental Income 50-100k -3.467*** -4.315*** -5.989***
(0.877) (0.407) (0.772)
Parental Income 100k+ 4.205*** 4.368*** 1.525**
(0.880) (0.434) (0.746)
Observations 128,680 372,232 172,720
R-squared 0.370 0.372 0.387
Note: This table presents the cross-sectional estimates of SAT and PSAT scores on college portfolio quality.
Column (1) examines colleges selected after the SAT for one-time takers. Column (2) examines colleges selected
after the first SAT for students who take the exam twice. Column (3) examines colleges selected after the second
SAT for students who take the exam twice. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5,
and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 3: One-Time Takers: Portfolio Updating in Response to the SAT
Average SAT of Matriculates
New Colleges Added to Portfolio Cumulative Portfolio
Adjusted Adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PSAT Score 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.132*** 0.116*** 0.123***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
SAT Score 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.160*** 0.141*** 0.149***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
After SAT * PSAT Score -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.045*** -0.012*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) (0.004)
After SAT * SAT Score 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.053*** 0.029*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 0.006 (0.005) (0.005)
Student Controls (x Post) X X X X X X
High School FEs (x Post) X
Zip Code FEs (x Post) X X X X
Observations 258,036 258,036 258,036 258,036 258,036 258,036
R-squared 0.360 0.339 0.359 0.397
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly released SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for alternative specifications. Columns (1)-(4) present the change in the average SAT of matriculating
students at colleges selected before and after a student’s score is released. Columns (5) and (6) present the change
in the cumulative portfolio as a result. The estimates in columns (4) and (6) have been adjusted to account for
strategies that are correlated with student aptitude. Student controls include high school grade point average,
race, and household income. Each specification includes the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the
post period. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. Bootstrapped errors are used in columns (4) and
(6) to account for the fact that the adjusted outcomes incorporate the estimates of Ωt. The symbols *, **, and
*** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 4: One-Time Takers: Alternate Measures of Portfolio Quality
Min Max Percent In-State 4-Year
SAT SAT Private Tuition Grad Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSAT Score 0.097*** 0.126*** 0.021*** 7.471*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.298) (0.001)
SAT Score 0.127*** 0.147*** 0.020*** 7.475*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.304) (0.001)
After SAT * PSAT Score -0.044*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -2.993*** -0.005***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.444) (0.001)
After SAT * SAT Score 0.011* 0.118*** 0.011*** 4.093*** 0.010***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.459) (0.001)
Observations 258,036 258,036 258,036 257,919 256,947
R-squared 0.212 0.322 0.081 0.171 0.291
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly released SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for alternative measures of quality. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) correspond to the lowest and
highest average SAT score of matriculating students among colleges in the portfolio. Column (3) is the fraction
of colleges in the portfolio that are private not-for-profit (rather than public or for-profit). Column (4) considers
the average in-state tuition for colleges in the portfolio and column (5) is the average graduation rate within four
years for colleges in the portfolio. Student controls include high school grade point average, race, and household
income. Each specification includes the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Standard
errors are clustered at the zip code level. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5,
and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 5: Two-Time Takers: Portfolio Updating in Response to Each SAT
Average SAT of Matriculates
New Colleges Added to Portfolio Cumulative Portfolio
Adjusted Adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PSAT Score 0.075*** 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.090*** 0.077*** 0.084***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SAT 1 Score 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.111***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
SAT 2 Score 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.127*** 0.104*** 0.109*** 0.119***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
After SAT 1 * PSAT Score -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.010* -0.016***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
After SAT 1 * SAT 1 Score 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.026*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
After SAT 1 * SAT 2 Score 0.011*** 0.011* 0.011* -0.004 0.007 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
After SAT 2 * PSAT Score -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.051*** -0.017*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
After SAT 2 * SAT 1 Score 0.019*** 0.016** 0.017** 0.000 0.024*** 0.015**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
After SAT 2 * SAT 2 Score 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.062*** 0.024*** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Student Controls (x Post) X X X X X X
High School FEs (x Post) X
Zip Code FEs (x Post) X X X X
Observations 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,506
R-squared 0.388 0.377 0.389 0.442
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly released SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for alternative specifications. Columns (1)-(4) present the change in the average SAT of matriculating
students at colleges selected before and after students’ first and second SAT scores are released. Columns (5)
and (6) present the change in the cumulative portfolio as a result. The estimates in columns (4) and (6) have
been adjusted to account for strategies that are correlated with student aptitude. Student controls include high
school grade point average, race, and household income. Bootstrapped errors are used in columns (4) and (6) to
account for the fact that the adjusted outcomes incorporate the estimates of Ωt. Each specification includes the
interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post periods. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code
level. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 6: Two-Time Takers: Alternate Measures of Portfolio Quality
Min Max Percent In-State 4-Year
SAT SAT Private Tuition Grad Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSAT Score 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.017*** 5.483*** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.362) (0.001)
SAT 1 Score 0.089*** 0.102*** 0.020*** 6.735*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.425) (0.001)
SAT 2 Score 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.010*** 4.819*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.411) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * PSAT Score -0.017** -0.021*** -0.004* -1.164** -0.003***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.506) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * SAT 1 Score 0.042*** 0.057*** 0.007*** 2.937*** 0.007***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.600) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * SAT 2 Score 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.977* 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.576) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * PSAT Score -0.059*** -0.022*** -0.009*** -2.858*** -0.006***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.553) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * SAT 1 Score 0.024*** 0.017* -0.001 0.449 0.003**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.645) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * SAT 2 Score 0.015** 0.131*** 0.010*** 4.036*** 0.011***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.622) (0.001)
Observations 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,378 333,687
R-squared 0.241 0.336 0.095 0.182 0.315
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly released SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for alternative measures of quality. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) correspond to the lowest and
highest average SAT score of matriculating students among colleges in the portfolio. Column (3) is the fraction
of colleges in the portfolio that are private not-for-profit (rather than public or for-profit). Column (4) considers
the average in-state tuition for colleges in the portfolio and column (5) is the average graduation rate within four
years for colleges in the portfolio. Student controls include high school grade point average, race, and household
income. Each specification includes the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Standard
errors are clustered at the zip code level. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5,
and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 9: Extensive Margins: Retaking and Score Reports
Retook SAT Sent Post-Exam Reports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
| SAT - PSAT | -0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
| SAT - PSAT | *Positive -0.0007*** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PSAT Score -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
High School GPA 0.1058*** 0.1144*** 0.0788*** 0.0764***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Male -0.0215*** -0.0164*** -0.0165*** -0.0179***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Asian 0.0881*** 0.0852*** 0.0341*** 0.0349***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Black -0.0031* -0.0114*** 0.0597*** 0.0620***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Hispanic -0.0163*** -0.0214*** -0.0012 0.0003
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Parental Income 50-100k 0.0570*** 0.0585*** 0.0331*** 0.0327***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Parental Income 100k+ 0.0904*** 0.0923*** 0.0499*** 0.0494***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Observations 1,157,855 1,157,855 1,157,855 1,157,855
R-squared 0.066 0.070 0.073 0.073
Note: This table examines the determinants of whether students retake the SAT and whether they send additional
score reports. Columns (1) and (2) examine the extent to which student characteristics, household characteristics,
and the magnitude of the score shock are correlated with retaking the exam. Columns (3) and (4) examine
the extent to which these factors are correlated with sending additional score reports after taking the exam.
The specifications includes the number and quality of reports sent prior to taking the SAT as additional control
variables. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 10: Joint Sample and Lower Bounds
Joint Sample Lower Bound Lower Bound
One and Two One-Time Takers Two-Time Takers
Time Takers [No Updating] [No Updating]
(1) (2) (3)
PSAT Score 0.129*** 0.086*** 0.067***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
SAT 1 Score 0.128*** 0.086*** 0.084***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
SAT 2 Score 0.087***
(0.002)
After SAT 1 * PSAT Score -0.009*** -0.002 -0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
After SAT 1 * SAT 1 Score 0.055*** 0.014*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
After SAT 1 * SAT 2 Score 0.007**
(0.003)
Students 240,541 627,190 534,399
Observations 481,082 1,254,380 1,603,197
R-squared 0.388 0.233 0.336
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly released SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for a joint sample of one- and two-time takers in column (1) and under the assumption of no updating
for students who do not send additional reports in columns (2) and (3). Each column presents the change in the
average SAT of matriculating students at colleges selected before and after a student’s score is released. Student
controls include high school grade point average, race, and household income. Each specification includes the
interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code
level. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
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A Strategy Adjusted Estimates
The section presents revised estimates after accounting for strategies that are correlated with stu-
dent aptitude. This is important if higher aptitude students systematically apply more or less
aggressively after receiving their scores.
A.1 Estimating Strategy
As introduced in Section 3.3, we can estimate time-varying strategies that are correlated with
aptitude by estimating yt = dts+ t for the outcome of interest yt on a measure of aptitude s that
is known to the student in every period. The estimate of time-varying strategy relative to the last
period T is Ωˆt =
dt
dT
. This captures how portfolio characteristics vary across period as a function
of the measure of student aptitude.
Table A1 presents estimates of Ωt using the PSAT as the measure of aptitude known to the
student in every period. Values less than 1 indicate that the outcome is systematically larger in
the post exam period for students with higher measures of aptitude (i.e. the d0 < d1 for one-
time takers and d0 < d2 or d1 < d2 for two-time takers). This appears to be the case for 5 of
the 7 outcomes, suggesting that higher aptitude students are generally more aggressive with their
post-exam portfolio than are lower aptitude students.
A.2 Adjusted Estimates for Alternative Outcomes
The strategy adjusted estimates are included for the primary measure of college quality, SAT of
matriculates, in Tables 3 and 5 of the text. We present the equivalent estimates for alternative
outcomes in Tables A2 and A3. These estimates indicate strong evidence of updating in response to
new information. For one-time takers, post-exam portfolios significantly discount the information
in the PSAT while placing significantly greater weight on the newly released SAT scores. Likewise,
for two-time takers, students only place additional weight on the first and second scores after they
are released. Importantly, there is no evidence that the second score is incorporated significantly
when only the first score is known. This provides strong evidence that students do not anticipate
future scores. This evidence is strengthened by the timing of when students select their portfolios.
Specifically, colleges selected after the first exam are frequently chosen shortly before taking the
SAT for a second time (as one of the student’s four free reports). Thus, if time-varying covariates
are generating bias, reports sent after the first exam is taken should be more correlated with the
second score than the first score.
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Table A1: Estimates of Strategy Adjustment: Omega
New Cumulative Min Max Percent In-State Grad
SAT SAT SAT SAT Private Tuition Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
One-Time Takers
Omega (t=0) 0.883 0.949 1.206 0.751 1.063 0.967 0.898
(0.010) 0.010 (0.020) (0.009) (0.031) (0.018) (0.012)
Two-Time Takers
Omega (t=0) 0.861 0.919 1.135 0.712 1.061 0.948 0.866
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.026) (0.016) (0.011)
Omega (t=1) 0.972 0.980 1.258 0.810 1.180 1.073 0.978
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.029) (0.018) (0.011)
Note: This table presents the estimates of time-varying strategy Ωt. The top and bottom panels present the
adjustments used for one and two-time takers, respectively. Estimates are based on changes in the outcome
variable between periods as a function of performance on the PSAT. The resulting estimates are used to adjust
the outcomes presented in Tables A2 and A3.
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Table A2: One-Time Takers: Alternate Measures of Portfolio Quality (Adjusted)
Min Max Percent In-State 4-Year
SAT SAT Private Tuition Grad Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSAT Score 0.081*** 0.169*** 0.020*** 7.733*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.280) (0.001)
SAT Score 0.106*** 0.195*** 0.019*** 7.726*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.343) (0.001)
After SAT * PSAT Score -0.027*** -0.061*** -0.011*** -3.346*** -0.007***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.405) (0.001)
After SAT * SAT Score 0.032*** 0.071*** 0.012*** 3.924*** 0.008***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.475) (0.001)
Observations 258,036 258,036 258,036 257,919 256,947
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly released SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio after adjusting for application strategies. The outcomes are adjusted as detailed in Section 3.3 prior
to estimation. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) correspond to the lowest and highest average SAT score of
matriculating students among colleges in the portfolio. Column (3) is the fraction of colleges in the portfolio that
are private not-for-profit (rather than public or for-profit). Column (4) considers the average in-state tuition for
colleges in the portfolio and column (5) is the average graduation rate within four years for colleges in the portfolio.
Student controls include high school grade point average, race, and household income. Each specification includes
the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Bootstrapped standard errors are used to
account for the fact that the outcomes incorporate the estimates of Ωt.
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Table A3: Two-Time Takers: Alternate Measures of Portfolio Quality (Adjusted)
Min Max Percent In-State 4-Year
SAT SAT Private Tuition Grad Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSAT Score 0.061*** 0.115*** 0.016*** 5.779*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.350) (0.001)
SAT 1 Score 0.078*** 0.145*** 0.019*** 7.166*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.433) (0.001)
SAT 2 Score 0.096*** 0.139*** 0.010*** 5.035*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.411) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * PSAT Score -0.019*** -0.039*** -0.005 -1.736 -0.004
(0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.446) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * SAT 1 Score 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.004** 1.755*** 0.006***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.569) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * SAT 2 Score -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.392 -0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.536) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * PSAT Score -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.009*** -3.169*** -0.007***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.518) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * SAT 1 Score 0.034*** -0.026** 0.000 0.010 0.000
(0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.691) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * SAT 2 Score 0.029*** 0.092*** 0.010*** 3.848*** 0.009***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.644) (0.001)
Observations 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,378 333,687
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly released SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio after adjusting for application strategies. The outcomes are adjusted as detailed in Section 3.3 prior
to estimation. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) correspond to the lowest and highest average SAT score of
matriculating students among colleges in the portfolio. Column (3) is the fraction of colleges in the portfolio that
are private not-for-profit (rather than public or for-profit). Column (4) considers the average in-state tuition for
colleges in the portfolio and column (5) is the average graduation rate within four years for colleges in the portfolio.
Student controls include high school grade point average, race, and household income. Each specification includes
the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Bootstrapped standard errors are used to
account for the fact that the outcomes incorporate the estimates of Ωt.
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